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Abstract 
An important feature of aid to developing countries is that it is given to the government. 
As a result, aid should be expected to affect fiscal behaviour, although theory and 
existing evidence is ambiguous regarding the nature of these effects. This paper applies 
techniques developed in the ‘macroeconometrics’ literature to estimate the dynamic 
linkages between aid and fiscal aggregates. Vector autoregressive methods are applied 
to 34 years of annual data in Ghana to model the effect of aid on fiscal behaviour. 
Results suggest that aid to Ghana has been associated with reduced domestic borrowing 
and increased tax effort, combining to increase public spending. This constructive use of 
aid to maintain fiscal balance is evident since the mid-1980s, following Ghana’s 
structural adjustment programme. The paper provides evidence that aid has been 
associated with improved fiscal performance in Ghana, implying that the aid has been 
used sensibly (at least in fiscal terms). 
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Recent arguments for doubling aid to Africa are premised on ‘boosting public 
expenditure—on vital areas such as education, health and infrastructure’ (Commission 
for Africa 2005: 293). Research shows that aid increases spending on social sectors 
(health, education and sanitation) and contributes to improving aggregate welfare, 
although in the poorest recipients the effectiveness of social spending in delivering 
welfare improvements is low (Gomanee et al. 2005). While the effectiveness of public 
spending is clearly an important issue, a prior concern is how aid affects spending and 
fiscal behaviour more generally (including effects on tax effort and borrowing). 
Identifying the fiscal effects of aid is a prerequisite to understanding the macroeconomic 
effectiveness of aid (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000). This paper is a contribution, 
providing an empirical method to estimate fiscal impact and applying this to Ghana. 
There is a growing literature on how aid affects the fiscal behaviour of governments 
(reviewed in McGillivray and Morrissey 2001). Studies in this area have been classified 
into two broad groups. First, fungibility studies have sought to analyse effects of aid on 
the composition of government spending. Aid is said to be fungible if it is given for one 
purpose (say investment) and used for another (consumption). These studies tend to be 
critical, typically finding evidence of considerable fungibility (aid is not necessarily 
allocated to the spending headings intended by donors), but are subject to many 
shortcomings that undermine the results (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000). The second 
approach, using fiscal response models (FRMs), goes further and argues that aid has 
complex impacts on government fiscal behaviour—on tax effort and borrowing in 
addition to effects on the allocation of expenditures. These studies tend to find that aid 
ultimately leads to increased spending, and total spending often increases by more than 
the value of aid (McGillivray and Morrissey 2001). There is evidence that aid has had a 
beneficial impact on investment and recurrent spending in Sub-Saharan African 
countries (Commission for Africa 2005: 314). 
Fiscal response models describe the relationship between fiscal aggregates: 
governments raise revenue from different sources (e.g. taxes, aid, borrowing) and 
allocate them to different expenditures (e.g. capital or recurrent), attempting to meet 
some revenue and expenditure targets. Franco-Rodriguez, McGillivray and Morrissey 
(1998) provide a full description of FRMs in which aid is treated like the other forms of 
revenue. Governments have expected values (targets) for aid, other revenue and 
expenditures, and their fiscal behaviour is an attempt to meet these targets subject to the 
budget constraint. The models explicitly recognize that the fiscal effects of aid can 
differ from country to country, so the literature has evolved as case studies. 
A characteristic of FRMs that some might view as a serious limitation, is that they are 
not predictive theories, in the sense that they do not generate specific testable 
hypotheses of the effects of aid on fiscal behaviour. For example, FRMs do not predict 
that aid will increase investment spending or will reduce tax effort; aid is posited to 
have effects as fiscal variables are related, but in a manner that can only be determined 
empirically. It is more appropriate to think of FRMs as a representation of the fiscal 
relationships that suggest an empirical specification to test if aid leads to an increase (or 
not) in other fiscal variables. However, empirical applications of FRMs have their 
shortcomings. In particular, there are difficulties in estimating the targets for 
government expenditure and revenue, and the three-stage non-linear econometric 4 
techniques used can be difficult to implement and very demanding of data (McGillivray 
and Morrissey 2001). 
We circumvent these empirical problems by estimating the FRM within a vector 
autoregression (VAR) modelling framework. This situation of interrelated variables is 
particularly suited to estimation using a VAR approach, as in essence the VAR is 
posited on there being a relationship between the variables in the system and lets the 
data reveal the nature of that relationship. Although different (exogenous) factors 
influence the values of each fiscal variable, the fiscal aggregates must maintain a 
relationship with each other, and this can be generally described as a VAR model. 
Furthermore, the VAR approach facilitates policy simulation taking into account the 
linkages between the components of the budget. VAR methods offer a number of 
advantages in the current context. First, as our aim is merely to investigate the dynamic 
effect of aid on the components of the budget, estimation of the reduced form rather 
than a complete structural economic model is sufficient for our purposes. Specifically, 
the ‘atheoretical’ nature of VAR models means one does not have to maintain the 
existence of, or estimate, the targets, as they are only required for the structural 
representation. Second, assumptions about exogeneity can be directly tested within the 
VAR using the data, and can then be applied to simulate the effect of injections of aid 
via impulse response analysis. The VAR provides a tractable framework in which a 
different set of questions to those traditionally posed may be addressed. As recognized 
below, the VAR has its own limitations, especially as our sample of 34 years is short for 
time-series econometric analysis, even if it is reasonably long in the context of 
macroeconomic studies of African countries. 
In section 2 we discuss trends in foreign aid flows and fiscal variables in Ghana during 
the period under investigation (1966 to 1998). Section 3 presents a brief outline of the 
VAR approach and impulse response functions that capture the effect of a shock to one 
variable (in our case aid) on the other endogenous (fiscal) variables in the system. 
Section 4 begins by defining the data used and then presents our results. The results 
suggest that in Ghana aid has substituted for domestic borrowing rather than 
discouraging tax effort or inducing a net increase in government spending. The 
conclusions are in section 5, where we argue that estimating the aggregate fiscal effects 
of aid is far more informative than considering only fungibility (which, in the case of 
Ghana, would have lead to incorrect conclusions on the effects of aid). 
2   Aid and fiscal trends in Ghana 
From about the mid-1960s to the early 1980s in Ghana, there were only minor 
differences in fiscal behaviour under the various governments (Frimpong-Ansah 1991; 
Rimmer 1992). The only exception was the brief period between 1969 and 1971 when 
the Progress Party government came to power and initiated a relatively more 
neoclassical (laissez faire) approach to development. Aid inflows were unlikely to have 
been an influence on government behaviour prior to the mid-1980s. In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, aid was a little over two per cent of GDP and about 12 per cent of 
revenue, while donors at that time did not require or enforce conditionality (at least not 
in terms of fiscal behaviour). The unilateral repudiation of foreign loans in the early 
1970s lends some support to this argument. Significant reserves and the importance of 
cocoa revenue (even if in decline by the early 1970s) gave most of the Ghanaian  
5 
governments over that period a false sense of economic security. It also meant that they 
were not very responsive to external pressure from donors. The decision to adopt and 
adhere to the ‘liberalizing’ economic recovery programme/structural adjustment 
programme (ERP/SAP) in the 1980s was simply because there were no more ‘easy 
pickings’—the country’s reserves had been wiped out and the cocoa sector was on the 
brink of collapse. 
Prior to 1983 public expenditures persistently exceeded revenues in Ghana (and 
domestic sources of revenue were more important in relation to aid than was the case). 
This resulted in large fiscal deficits, which peaked at about 11 per cent of GDP in 1976. 
These deficits were financed mainly by domestic borrowing and printing money. The 
deficit did narrow after 1983 and by the late 1980s revenues had outstripped 
expenditures. Most of the surplus was due to the large inflow of foreign aid (Addison 
and Osei 2001). The mid-1980s saw a massive inflow of aid into Ghana, peaking in 
1991 at almost US$730 million, compared to less that US$2000 million in the period up 
to 1986, in 1995 prices (Figure 1). 
The late 1980s saw government expenditures rising sharply after a steady decline during 
the 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 2)—increasing from about US$310 million in 1983 
to about US$1.9 billion in 1998. The period average for the share of aid in total 
government spending also rose to about 50 per cent over the post-1983 period compared 
to about 16 per cent prior to 1983. However, structural adjustment aid was not all 
targeted at capital investment. Much was in the form of budget support: it was a source 
of revenue that would, in some part, have been allocated to recurrent expenditures. 
Investment in building schools, for example, is of little use if the government cannot 
pay teacher’s wages. From a fiscal response perspective, what is of more interest is the 
effect on other revenues and the dynamics of spending. 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 


























Looking at the components of government expenditure one observes that it is 
government consumption that has accounted for most of the increase in public 
expenditure—from about US$264 million in 1983 to about US$1.2 billion in 1998. 
However, the share of current government spending in the total increased only slightly 
between the two periods (pre- and post-1983), from about 75 to about 77 per cent 
(Figure 3).   
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As with the pattern of most macroeconomic variables for Ghana, tax revenue has 
generally increased in the last two decades following a period of decline in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. From about US$700 million in 1970 tax revenues fell to about US$160 
million in 1983 but subsequently increased by more than seven fold, reaching almost 
US$1.2 billion in 1998 (Figure 1). It is worth noting that the increase in tax revenue 
coincides with the period over which there was a substantial inflow of aid into Ghana 
suggesting that aid flows did not discourage tax effort. It is also worth noting that the 
period of increasing government spending was associated with an increase in aid and 
tax revenues. In other words, whilst one might infer a structural break in the individual 
series, overall revenues and expenditures moved together in the same way (although the 
composition may have changed). 
Domestic borrowing also shows an interesting pattern (Figure 1). From an all-period 
high of about US$440 million in 1976 domestic borrowing fell to negative levels in the 
late 1980s and reached net repayments of US$110 million by 1991.1 This was in the 
period of structural adjustment, when it was not uncommon for the IMF to require net 
repayment of domestic debt (negative borrowing). The 1990s saw a reemergence of the 
large fiscal deficits not seen since the 1970s. The considerable slowdown of aid inflows 
coupled with a reluctance to reduce spending in the election years of 1992 and 1996 led 
to substantial increase in domestic borrowing during the 1990s.  
3 Econometric  methods 
In recent years, vector autoregressive methods have become the ‘tool of choice’ in much 
of empirical macroeconometrics. Despite having roots in the analysis of stationary data, 
their popularity owes much to the theoretical developments in the analysis of 
non-stationary data which typically characterizes many economic time-series. In 
particular, Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1992) have developed 
multivariate methods that explicitly use the VAR for the testing and estimation of 
cointegration (or ‘long-run’) relationships among nonstationary data. As a medium for 
analysis, the VAR is tractable and can be interpreted as the reduced form representation 
of a large class of dynamic structural models (Hamilton 1994: 326-7). As such, it 
provides a useful framework for the investigation of both long-run (cointegration) 
relationships and short-run dynamics (via an equilibrium correction model, the ECM) of 
the variables in the system. Furthermore, the VAR facilitates the dynamic simulation of 
variables within the system following a shock using impulse response analysis (Sims 
1980; Lütkepohl and Reimers 1992). In the current context, we use these techniques to 
evaluate the role played by foreign aid in the national budget of Ghana. 
Given the familiarity of VAR methods, we merely sketch the broad outline here; 
Hamilton (1994: Chapter 11) offers a thorough and rigorous treatment. The statistical 
analysis takes place in a VAR(p) model, of lag length p: 
t t p t p t t t   .   .   .   ε Ψ Φ Φ Φ + + + + + = − − − w x x x x 2 2 1 1  (1) 
where  t x  is a ( 1 × m ) vector of jointly determined I(1) variables,  t w  is a ( 1 × q ) vector 
of deterministic variables and each  i Φ  ( p i , , 1K = ) and Ψ are ( m m× ) and ( q m× ) 
                                                 
1  Note that aid inflows reached an all time high of US$730 million in 1991. 8 
matrices of coefficients to be estimated using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of data.  t ε  is a 
( 1 × m ) vector of n.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and non-diagonal covariance 
matrix, Σ.  
Providing the variables are (at most) integrated of order one {I(1)} and cointegrated, 
equation (1) also has an equilibrium correction representation that is observationally 
equivalent but which facilitates estimation and hypothesis testing as all terms are 










t t i t i p t t ε Ψ Δ Γ αβ Δ w x x x  (2) 
Attention focuses on the ( r n× ) matrix of cointegrating vectors, β, that quantify the 
‘long-run’ relationships between the variables in the system and the ( r n× ) matrix of 
equilibrium correction coefficients, α, elements of which load deviations from this 
equilibrium (i.e.  k t ' − x β ) in to Δxt, for correction. The Γi  coefficients in (2) estimate the 
short-run effect of shocks on Δxt, and thereby allow the short- and long-run responses to 
differ. 
However, given the interrelationships that characterize economic systems, it is often more 
informative to undertake an impulse response analysis when short- and long-run impacts 
are of key interest. As total derivatives, the coefficients of the impulse response function 
do not suffer from the ceteris paribus limitation that can confound the interpretation of (2) 
(Lütkepohl and Reimers 1992). In cases where variables are interrelated, a shock to one 
variable may set off a chain reaction of knock-on and feedback effects as it permeates 
through the system. In such circumstances, the partial derivatives of (2), which ignore 
these interactions by construction, may have limited appeal and may give a misleading 
impression of the short- and long-run effect of such shocks. By contrast, impulse response 
analysis estimates the net effect of the direct and indirect effects of a shock, not only in 
the long run but at all periods following the shock. 




− − − + + + + =
0 i
i t i t t t   .   .   .   w A A A x Ψ ε ε ε 2 2 1 1 t  (3) 
where the ( m m× ) coefficient matrices  i A  can be obtained according to 
p i p i i i A   .   .   .   − − − + + + = Φ Φ Φ 2 2 1 1 A A A   .,   .   .   i , 2 , 1 =  (4) 
with  m I A = 0  and  0 A = i  for  0 < i . 
Following Pesaran and Shin (1998), the generalized impulse response is the effect of 
one standard error shock to the 
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9 
where  j e  is an  1 × m  selection vector that identifies the source of the shock (hence unity 
is its 
th j  element with zeros elsewhere). This delivers time profiles of the effect of 
hypothetical shocks to elements of  t ε  on the level of  t x  taking into account the 
knockon and feedback effects that characterize the variables in a dynamic system such 
as (1). Note that the generalized impulse response function accounts for the 
contemporaneous correlation inherent in the nondiagonality of Σ via integrating out 
their effects according to the observed distribution of the residuals, rather than by 
traditional orthogonalization. In so doing, the generalized impulse response function is 
invariant to the ordering of the variables in the model, unlike its orthogonalized 
counterpart. Nevertheless, as with all dynamic simulation, if the effects of a shock are to 
be economically meaningful, the shock must represent a pure innovation to a particular 
variable rather than a mixture of correlated errors. As this requires the causality of the 
economic structure to be known, impulse responses are prone to misinterpretation 
(Ericsson, Hendry and Mizon 1998: 379). Mindful of this caveat, we offer statistical and 
economic evidence to support the legitimacy of the impulse response analysis we 
conduct. 
4  Data and results 
The empirical analogue of (1) comprises the variables of the fiscal response model, 
namely, government expenditure (G), tax revenue (R), aid finance (F) and domestic 
borrowing (D). Note that as nontax components of revenue and external borrowing are 
omitted, we are not estimating an identity. We also estimate a model in which total 
government expenditure (G) is disaggregated into capital (GK) and current spending 
(GC). We use annual data over the period 1966 to 1998 with all the variables measured 
in constant 1995 prices expressed in US$ (units of 100m). Data on total domestic fiscal 
variables are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. Foreign 
aid is the net disbursement of official development assistance (ODA) to Ghana, derived 
from OECD/DAC data. It includes all loans with a grant element of more than 25 per 
cent and also technical cooperation and assistance.2  
As a precursor to the empirical analysis the order of integration of the individual series 
is evaluated using standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests. Results, reported in 
Table 1, indicate that all variables are I(1) with no significant drift, as indeed casual 
inspection of the data in Figures 1-3 suggests, and allowing for any structural break (the 
P-P test).3 Consequently, the variable sets ( t R ,  t F ,  t D   t G ) and ( t R ,  t F ,  t D ,  t GK , 
t GC ) form the equations for the aggregate and disaggregate VAR(p) models 
respectively.  
                                                 
2  Unfortunately, this is a donor measure of aid and overstates the amount actually entering into the 
government budget. As such it is only a proxy, but was the only data available. As our interest is in 
identifying the sign and relative magnitude of effects on other variables, this should not seriously 
affect the results. All data and statistical output are available from the authors on request. 
3   Inspection of the data in Figures 1 and 2 suggests a structural break, but this appears to occur in all 
series around 1983-84. As the series all move together, this suggests there is no break in the system 
(the cointegrating relationship), as confirmed by the absence of a break in the residuals of the CI (see 
Appendix Figure A). 10 
Table 1 
ADF unit roots tests  
ADF Model:  ∑
=
− − Δ + + + = Δ
p
i
i t i t t Y Y T Y
1
1 δ γ β α  
Y =             H0: γ=0 
H0: β=γ=0 
  φ3 – test 
H0:β=α=γ= 0 
φ2 – test  Lag length  P - P  Inference 


































































Note:   Numbers in parenthesis are the 10 per cent critical values. Optimal lag length is the largest p for 
which  δi is significant at the 10 per cent level. The null hypothesis for a second unit root is 
rejected for all the I(1) variables at the 10 per cent level. The Phillips-Perron (P-P) test confirms 
that the series are I(1) allowing for a structural break. 
The appropriate lag length (p) of the VAR is determined using standard model selection 
criteria (AIC, SBC and HQC). Adoption of a general-to-specific modelling approach 
points to a VAR of order 2 or 3 as an adequate representation of the data. Given that 
there are signs of autocorrelation in the residuals from a VAR(2), we opt for a VAR(3) 
which has residuals that conform to the usual assumptions. Having established an 
adequate statistical description of the data, we test for the presence of long-run 
relationships among the variables using the Johansen and Juselius (1992) trace statistic 
for cointegration.4 The results reported in Table 2 (Part A) confirm the presence of a 
single cointegration vector at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
Normalizing on domestic borrowing the relationship is estimated as  
465 . 0 841 . 0 040 . 1 074 . 0 + + − − = t t t t G R F D    (6) 
These long-run estimates suggest that ceteris paribus, aid and tax revenue tend to be 
negatively correlated with domestic borrowing, whereas government spending is 
positively correlated. As such, (6) seems to represent financing items in the government 
budget constraint. Note that the coefficient on aid is small suggesting that its long-run 
impact in the budget is minor. Government spending and revenue have coefficients that 
 
                                                 
4  Since the limiting distribution of Trace test is a function of the deterministic terms included in the 
model, we report results for the final model in which the constant is restricted to the long run only, 
given that the results in Table 1 indicate the absence of drift. Cointegration inference is unchanged 
using models with unrestricted constants.   
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Table 2 
Cointegration test results 
 (a)  Aggregate  model 
Eigenvalues H0: Trace  statistic  P-value 
0.7005  r ≤  0  69.262  0.001 
0.4649  r ≤  1  33.098  0.082 
0.3080  r ≤  2  14.340  0.273 
0.1040  r ≤  3  3.294  0.538 
      
  (b) Disaggregate model 
Eigenvalues H0: Trace  statistic  P-value 
0.7255  r ≤  0  91.287  0.002 
0.5470  r ≤  1  52.502  0.068 
0.3612  r ≤  2  28.746  0.212 
0.3233  r ≤  3  15.302  0.214 
0.1127  r ≤  4  3.588 0.488 
 
are nearly equal and opposite in sign, and together these results suggest that, in the long 
run, domestic borrowing is the main financing item for primary deficits in Ghana. In 
addition, this supports the view that aid is given to alleviate short- and medium-term 
constraints, or to achieve certain development objectives but not to finance persistent 
budgetary deficits. This does not imply that aid has no long-term impact in the economy 
as a whole, but merely that as a budgeting item its long-run impact is relatively minor.  
Equation (6) assumes that all forms of government spending have an equal effect on the 
other items in the budget. Disaggregating government expenditure into its capital and 
current components yields consistent results. Table 2(b)  indicates the presence of a 
single long-run relation of the form 
61 . 0 197 . 1 723 . 0 072 . 1 051 . 0 + + + − − = t t t t t GK GC R F D  (7) 
Ceteris paribus, both components increase the budget deficit in the long run. A test of 
coefficient equivalence suggests that the long-run budgetary impact of capital spending 
is greater than that of current government spending.5 Our normalization is in a sense ad 
hoc and so one could actually interpret this to be consistent with evidence for 
fungibility—the financing items (and in particular foreign aid) impact more on current 
spending than on capital spending.6 The question of whether aid has been fungible in 
Ghana is discussed under results for the impulse response analysis.  
The error correction models, which describe the short-run behaviour corresponding to 
(6) and (7), are reported in the Appendix. They reveal that in the short run, there is no 
ceteris paribus impact of aid on government spending, in either the aggregate or 
                                                 
5  The test is not very strong as the null hypothesis of equivalence is rejected at the 5% but not the 10 
percent level of significance. 
6  This can be seen if a normalization of equation (7) on  t GC is compared with that on  t GK  12 
disaggregated models. In contrast, aid is shown to increase revenue and reduce debt 
over the short run. 
4.1 Causality  testing 
Insights into the role played by the variables in fiscal response may also be gleaned 
from the ‘causality’ tests reported in Tables 3 and 4. Results for both the aggregate and 
disaggregate models (reported in panel (a) of both tables) indicate that it is only foreign 
aid that is weakly exogenous to the determination of the long-run fiscal relationship. As 
such, results indicate that whereas tax revenue, government spending and borrowing 
adjust to an imbalance in the fiscal situation, aid is taken as given, playing no 
discernible role in the adjustment process.  
 
Table 3 
Causality tests—aggregate model 
  (a) Weak exogeneity 
0 H : weak exogeneity  χ-squared  P-value 
Variable    
Revenue  11.888 0.0006 
Aid  0.049 0.8248 
Domestic borrowing  3.0099 0.0828 
Government expenditure  9.6048 0.0019 
  (b) Granger non-causality tests 
Direction  χ-squared P-value 
Aid → fiscal variables  69.47  0.0000 
Fiscal variables → aid  8.27  0.3090 
Notes:   In panel (b) a large test statistic (small p-value) indicates that the null hypothesis of Granger non-
causality is rejected. For example, the null of aid being Granger non-causal for the fiscal 
variables is rejected. 
Table 4  
Causality tests—disaggregate model 
  (a) Weak exogeneity 
0 H : weak exogeneity  χ-squared  P-value 
Variable    
Revenue 9.582  0.002 
Aid 0.3087  0.5787 
Domestic borrowing  4.6758  0.0306 
Current expenditure  7.3078  0.0069 
Capital expenditure  1.9103  0.1669 
  
  (b) Granger non-causality tests 
Direction  χ-squared P-value 
Aid → fiscal variables  72.9916  0.0000 
Fiscal variables → aid  7.4502  0.4889 
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The results in panel (b) of Tables 3 and 4 clearly point to aid being a Granger-cause of 
the fiscal variables but not vice versa.7 The combination of weak exogeneity and 
Granger non-causality suggests that aid is strongly exogenous, i.e. aid plays an 
important determining role in the budget but its level does not reflect budget imbalance. 
This suggests that aid disbursements have not been influenced by the budget balance 
over the period, and is consistent with our use of a donor measure of aid. Furthermore, 
this tends to suggest that shocks to foreign aid are exogenous to the system rather than 
determined by it and offers statistical support for the legitimacy of an impulse response 
analysis of aid shocks, to which our attention now turns. 
4.2  Impulse response analysis 
Plots of the generalized impulse response functions for a one standard deviation shock 
in aid are shown in Figures 4 and 5 for the aggregate and disaggregated models, 
respectively.8 Being of one standard error in size, the shock is of typical magnitude for 
the series and corresponds to some US$93 million (this would represent about 13 per 
cent of aid in 1998). Different levels of shock could be considered but these would 
represent scale effects and we are concerned with the pattern of effects. In each model, 
this injection of aid has persistent effects that take around five years to stabilize. Foreign 
aid appears to have pervasive effects throughout the fiscal system, reflecting the 
linkages between the budget items. Not only does aid result in an increase in the 
government’s spending and revenue base, but it leads to a reduction in borrowing. 
Estimates suggest that long-run responses in each of the variables to aid shocks are 
generally of twice the magnitude of the contemporaneous (or impact) effects. For 
example, as Figure 4 demonstrates, a US$93 million injection of aid induces borrowing 
to fall immediately by around US$20 million, well below its long-run effect of around 
US$36 million. It is also clear that the size of the effect on tax revenue and government 
expenditure is virtually identical (around US$76 million) suggesting that the net effect 
of aid is to reduce domestic borrowing. Figure 5 also indicates where the aid was spent, 
as it decomposes government spending into current and capital categories. Aid appears 
to have a differential effect on the two types of spending: the effects of aid on current 
spending dwarf those on capital spending in the short, medium and long terms. 
Estimates from Figure 5 suggests that in the long run at least, aid contributes around 
seven times more to current spending (which rises by US$56 million) than it does to 
capital spending (which rises by around US$8 million). As such, it casts doubt on the 
view that most aid was spent on capital projects with development objectives. However, 
whether this sheds any light on fungibility is uncertain as the proportion of aid intended 
for current and capital spending is unknown. To the extent that aid to Ghana over the 
period under study led to an increase in current but not capital spending, one could 
argue that it has been largely fungible. This conclusion will be valid if one could 
ascertain that aid was given to support capital spending. The period over which 
significant aid inflows were recorded for Ghana coincides with the reform period. 
During these years a significant portion of the aid consisted of ‘adjustment lending’ that 
                                                 
7  See Appendix Tables where the change in aid is shown to follow a simple AR(1) scheme in the VAR.   
8   The impulse response was implemented in Microfit 4.0 and the programme requires one to categorize 
the shock variable as endogenous to estimate the response. This is a ‘technical’ issue and is not 
inconsistent with our earlier argument that aid is exogenous. Confidence intervals are not reported as 
there is, as yet, no agreed method to calculate them. 14 
was not necessarily given for capital spending (much would have been intended for 
budget support). Between 1987 and 1991, 18 per cent of the total net aid was received 
under the structural adjustment facility (SAF).9 
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9  Calculated from the OECD-DAC data.  
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Although the evidence is consistent with fungibility, one should be wary of making such 
an assertion. An interesting corollary emerges from a comparison of results from the 
impulse response and error correction models (see Appendix). Specifically, aid does not 
have statistically significant short-run impacts on government spending in the ECMs, a 
result that contrasts with the responses in Figures 4 and 5. The ECMs do show, 
however, that aid does increase government revenue and reduce domestic borrowing 
over the short term. Since the parameters of the ECMs are ceteris paribus, this suggests 
that the rise in government spending following an aid shock, as is seen in Figures 4 
and 5, results from the knock-on effects between other variables in the budget, rather 
than from any direct effect of aid. This serves to underline the importance of the indirect 
linkages and suggests that in the short to medium run, the direct effect of aid is to 
reduce borrowing. In other words, aid is perceived as an alternative to domestic 
borrowing, rather than a source of government finance per se. This point is reinforced 
by the fact that both domestic borrowing and tax revenue have significant and positive 
effects on government spending in the short run in the ECMs.  
Results therefore suggest that Ghana’s expenditure patterns over the period do not 
appear to be wedded to the rises and falls of aid inflows, as is so often believed to be the 
case in developing countries. In the Ghanaian case at least, spending plans (presumably 
based upon the expectation of aid) appear to be implemented irrespective of the receipt 
of aid itself: borrowing is simply adjusted to balance the budget. Importantly, borrowing 
and aid appear to be substitutes for one another. This is illustrated by the experience of 
the election years of 1991/92 and 1995/96. Being reluctant to reign in spending at these 
key points in Ghana’s electoral cycle, the government increased borrowing to counteract 
the abrupt drops in aid flows. 
It is important to acknowledge the caveats that accompany the results that have been 
generated in this investigation. VARs are inherently overparameterized and thus results 
tend to be sensitive to model specification, sample size and lag length, particularly in 
small samples. For instance in the aggregate model which comprises three lags in four 
endogenous variables, 16 parameters are initially estimated with 33 observations. 
Nevertheless, the cointegration, ECM and impulse response approaches all yield 
consistent results.  
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have sought to analyse the effect of aid on fiscal behaviour in Ghana 
using annual data over the period 1966 to 1998. Fiscal response models, which look at 
the effect of aid on government fiscal behaviour, represent the basis of the study. Unlike 
fungibility studies that examine the effect of aid on categories of government spending, 
the fiscal response approach benefits from a broader focus. However, the FRMs 
employed in the existing literature have suffered from some serious problems, notably 
the need to estimate target values and an inability to incorporate dynamics. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on two fronts. First, we analyse the 
effect of aid on fiscal behaviour within a cointegrating VAR framework. The VAR 
approach allows us to estimate the interrelationship between fiscal variables and to 
capture some of the dynamics which, as the results here indicate, can differ 
considerably, highlighting the distinction between the short- and long-run effects. Tests 16 
suggest that aid is strongly exogenous within both the aggregate and disaggregated 
models. This provides an empirical justification for studying the dynamic impact of aid 
on fiscal behaviour, in particular using impulse response analysis. The main findings in 
this paper are summarized as follows. 
First the variables in the model, namely aid, total government expenditure (or its 
components), tax revenue and domestic borrowing, form a long-run relationship. Tax 
revenue and government spending have almost identical magnitudes with aid having a 
relatively insignificant effect in the long run. This suggests that domestic borrowing has 
been the main long-term financing item for primary deficits in Ghana, and that aid is 
used to alleviate short- to medium-term constraints. A plausible implication is that in 
periods where the level of domestic borrowing is lower, or after it has been lowered, aid 
would have a greater impact on spending if limits to borrowing were maintained. 
Second, results show that aid to Ghana over the period led to an increase in current but 
not capital spending, suggesting that aid has been fungible. This assertion is true only if 
aid was given mainly to finance capital spending. The evidence for this is not very 
strong as a significant part of foreign aid to Ghana over the period studied was received 
under the structural adjustment facility and could have been intended for current 
expenditures and general budget support. 
Third, impulse response analysis shows that injections of aid have a pervasive impact on 
the budget, inducing higher spending, increased tax effort and reduced domestic 
borrowing. As improved fiscal management and reduced domestic borrowing are 
common policy conditions attached to aid, this suggests that aid was associated with 
beneficial policy responses. Our analysis does not show that aid caused the desirable 
policy response, but the link from aid to good fiscal policy is a reasonable inference. 
The picture that emerges indicates that policymakers in Ghana perceived aid as an 
alternative to domestic borrowing and thus spending was not directly influenced by the 
year-on-year fluctuations in aid inflows. In other words, the absence/presence of aid did 
not directly alter public expenditure patterns but rather affected government borrowing 
from the domestic economy.  
The recent literature on aid and growth gives considerable attention to the relationship 
between aid and policy, and there is dispute over how aid and policy interact. Our study 
addresses one aspect of this for Ghana, the effect of aid on government fiscal behaviour. 
The results are illuminating. It appears that aid has been used as a substitute for 
domestic borrowing. It also appears that aid has been associated with increased tax 
effort. In general, both would be interpreted as ‘good’ policy responses. Although one 
cannot generalize from a one-country study, the evidence that tax/GDP ratios in 
Sub-Saharan African countries are high relative to other developing countries 
(Commission for Africa 2005: 297) cautions against any presumption that aid reduces 
tax effort. As Keen and Simone (2004) argue, low-income countries are severely 
constrained in their ability to increase tax/GDP ratios. It may well be that African 
countries are raising as much tax revenue as is feasible. 
It is not possible to distinguish aid as finance from aid as policy conditions, i.e. one 
cannot infer that good policy (say reducing borrowing) means that aid was used better, 
nor that aid promoted good policy. It is simply the case that, in fiscal terms, the aid 
appears to have been utilized sensibly. Good policy responses were made possible by 
the availability of aid finance. One can also observe an increase in government  
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spending, mostly current although the evidence that this is attributable directly to aid 
(rather than indirectly) is weak. To observe from the absence of a direct effect, as the 
fungibility approach would do, that aid did not increase government spending, in 
particular capital spending as intended (implying a ‘bad’ policy response) would be 
misleading. Any induced government expenditure effect of aid is matched by an 
increase in tax revenue so that the net effect of aid is to reduce domestic borrowing. A 
corollary of the results found here is that in order to gain a proper understanding of aid 
effectiveness, it is necessary to allow for the effects of aid on the fiscal behaviour of 
governments. This requires some type of fiscal response model, and we contend that the 
approach adopted here is a promising candidate. 
Our results should be considered as no more than indicative. The relatively short 
time-series for analysis constrains what could be incorporated in the VAR, and no 
confidence intervals are available for the impulse response results. It is possible that 
alternative ways of incorporating structural breaks, such as adding time dummies or a 
trend, would alter the results. It is, however, unlikely that the general pattern of results 
would change. The VAR, ECM and impulse response estimates give results that are 
consistent with each other and with observing the data. Furthermore, the results are 
plausible in that they are consistent with what is known about fiscal and aid policy in 
Ghana. A more serious limitation is the fact that even though the study identifies the 
fiscal impact of aid, we cannot draw inferences on the effectiveness of aid or of 
government spending. There is likely to be considerable scope in Ghana—as indeed, in 
all Sub-Saharan African countries in general—for improvement, not least in 
implementing measures to align aid and donor practices with expenditure and budgetary 
planning and practices (Commission for Africa 2005: 303). What our study does show, 
at least for Ghana, is that aid can support good fiscal policy. 18 
Appendix: Error correction models  
Appendix Table A—Aggregate model 
Variable  ΔRt  ΔGt  ΔDt    ΔFt 
ΔRt-1                 1.360**  2.544***  0.525    0.312 
ΔR t-2                0.731**  1.941***  0.715**    0.393 
ΔF t-1                 0.011  0.249  0.526**    -0.457* 
ΔF t-2                0.633**  0.206  -0.694**    0.385 
ΔG t-1                -1.055*  -2.146***  -0.685    -0.172 
ΔG t-2              -1.155***  -1.984***  -0.489    -0.335 
ΔD t-1               1.241**  2.407***  0.932    -0.077 
ΔD t-2               1.458***  1.842***  0.116    0.395 
EcmAMt-1                -3.474***  -3.948***  -0.151    -0.181 
        
R-Bar-Squared 0.523  0.464 0.504    0.226 
Autocorrelation    0.269 0.327 1.562    3.012* 
Normality    1.116 0.656 1.484    3.139 
        
  Vector diagnostic tests 
Autocorrelation F-Version  1.1425  (0.3445) 
Normality  Chi-squared Version  9.8297 (0.2772) 
Notes:    *, **, *** are respectively the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels of significance. The chi-squared version 
of the tests for autocorrelation and normality are reported. All the results except for the ‘vector 
diagnostics test’ are obtained from Microfit 4.0. The vector diagnostic tests are obtained from 
PcGive 10.  
 
 
Appendix Table B—Disaggregate model 
Variable  ΔRt  ΔCUt  ΔCAt  ΔDt  ΔFt 
ΔRt-1                 1.6825**  1.8040***  1.0029**  1.1077  0.5822 
ΔR t-2                0.9862**  0.9833***  1.2160***  1.0096**  0.5127 
ΔF t-1                 -0.1068  0.1467  -0.0040  0.5314**  -0.4676* 
ΔF t-2                0.5134*  0.1108  -0.0818  -0.5596*  0.4426 
ΔCU t-1                -0.8517  -1.3256**  -0.5108  -1.2175*  -0.3819 
ΔCU t-2              -1.2170**  -1.0786**  -0.8472***  -0.8313*  -0.5322 
ΔCA2 t-1                -1.9369**  -1.9212***  -1.2190**  -0.9550  -0.3907 
ΔCA2 t-2              -1.3764**  -1.1887**  -1.1570***  -0.8484  -0.3499 
ΔD t-1               1.4051**  1.8086***  0.7770**  1.2788**  0.0783 
ΔD t-2               1.4202***  0.9304**  0.8294***  0.5297  0.5196 
EcmDMt-1                -2.4699***  -2.1817***  -0.5534  -1.4873*  -0.3781 
       
R-Bar-Squared 0.5027  0.2319 0.7070 0.5087 0.1605 
Autocorrelation    1.2109 1.4062 0.8912 1.8157 4.0089** 
Normality   0.7113  1.1651 0.8868 1.7489 3.6073 
 
  Vector diagnostic tests 
Autocorrelation F-Version  1.1754 
Normality Chi-squared  Version  12.011 
Notes:  Same as in Appendix Table A.  
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Appendix Figure A 
Residuals of CI relationships 












The plot of the residuals of the cointegrating vectors (Figure A) for the aggregate 
(CVagg) and disaggregate (CVdis) models respectively, does support the results that the 
variables are cointegrated. These graphs also reveal that there is no obvious break in the 
residuals. This supports the argument made that structural breaks in the individual series 
are not problematic for the cointegrating relationship as all the variables appear to 
move, or break, together.  20 
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